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Don’t Believe Pundits’ Claims About the Cost of Brexit 
Experts agree leaving the European Union will damage the British economy, but past 
performance should make them wary of offering outlandish assertions about an unknowable 
future. 
Embattled British Prime Minister Theresa May put on a brave face last week at the U.K. 
Conservative Party’s annual conference in Birmingham. Facing pressure from all sides over 
what has become known as her Chequers proposal for an orderly Brexit, she reiterated her 
government’s commitment to leaving the European Union as scheduled on March 29 of next 
year. Ridiculing opponents’ calls for further compromise, she stated unequivocally that 
“Britain isn’t afraid to leave with no deal if we have to.” 
May’s feisty formal address was preempted by an off-program speech the day before by the 
former foreign secretary and perennial Conservative Party renegade Boris Johnson, who all 
but called for a no-deal hard Brexit as the only way to avoid bowing to a Brussels 
dictatorship. Johnson called the Chequers plan “a cheat” of the electorate and likened it to the 
14th-century offense of praemunire. (According to the Oxford English Dictionary, that’s “the 
offence of asserting or maintaining papal jurisdiction in England.”) 
 
In another reference that left watchers turning to Wikipedia for enlightenment, Johnson 
warned that the Chequers plan would see the United Kingdom “paraded in manacles down 
the Rue de la Loi like Caractacus.” (For the record, he’s referring to “a 1st-century AD 
British chieftain of the Catuvellauni tribe, who led the British resistance to the Roman 
conquest.”) 
As Johnson and other hard Brexiteers portray the Chequers plan as an abrogation of British 
sovereignty, hard core Remainers who want the United Kingdom to stay in the European 
Union routinely warn that a no-deal Brexit will be an economic catastrophe for their country. 
With no deal, British GDP growth would end up 8 percent lower over the following 15 
years, according to a leaked government report. Some economists have even said that the 
U.K. has already lost 2.1 percent of its GDP simply due to Brexit fears. 
It is certain that Britain’s membership in the European Union has to some extent 
compromised its national sovereignty, although not nearly on the scale suggested by Johnson. 
If the U.K. leaves the EU as scheduled next March, it will regain some degree of policy 
autonomy in areas such as agriculture and arms procurement. But the economic costs of 
leaving the EU are much harder to anticipate, if they turn out to be costs at all. 
But the economic costs of leaving the EU are much harder to anticipate, if they turn out 
to be costs at all. 
* * * 
It is rare for an expert whose career depends on making long-term economic forecasts to 
spend much time discussing the enormous uncertainties involved in making them. It 
shouldn’t be. Economists’ work involves adding up years or decades of small predictions to 
produce one big prediction. Will the British economy really be growing 8 percent more 
slowly by 2034 in the event of a no-deal Brexit? Maybe, but getting that answer right is the 
equivalent of having predicted U.S. GDP for 2018 way back in 2003. Over such time 
horizons, the imponderables vastly outweigh the ponderables. 
Note that a widely reported econometric evaluation from the IMF last month suggested that a 
no-deal Brexit would cost the EU 1.5 percent of GDP in the long run. The phrase “long run” 
was never clearly defined, although that caveat was broadly ignored. Read the report itself, 
and you’ll find that the IMF attached confidence intervals—ranges of likely values based on 
its statistical models—that run from 0 percent to 3 percent. In other words, in a few years or 
decades or centuries, the EU might be a little worse off—or it might not. 
What’s more, the confidence intervals themselves are based on the assumption that the IMF’s 
econometric model is a correct representation of the economy. Perhaps it’s worth 
remembering that as late as October 2008, a month after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the 
IMF model was still predicting that the U.S. economy would maintain positive growth in 
both 2008 and 2009. As it happened, the economy shrank both years. 
All this is not meant to knock the IMF, but rather to illustrate that econometric models are not 
very reliable or meaningful in times of rapid structural change. Projecting economic growth 
decades in advance requires accepting profound uncertainty.  
This arises from the fact that people change their behavior in response to rapidly evolving 
realities. 
Strict hard Brexit scenarios often construe “no deal” in the most literal terms possible. So, for 
example, no dealers suggest that all passenger flights between the United Kingdom and 
countries in the European Union would be suspended on March 30 because the respective 
carriers would no longer be licensed to land at each other’s airports. It seems safe to say that 
this won’t happen under any conceivable Brexit scenario, given that London’s airports handle 
thousands of EU carriers’ flights every week. 
More realistically, a hard Brexit might mean that London-based financial firms would lose 
their ability to operate in the European Union. Chop off all the financial services business 
that the U.K. gets from the EU, and that’s a lot of money. Assume that all those firms will 
relocate to Paris or Frankfurt, Germany, and that’s a lot more. Turn to reality, and there have 
been only minor personnel shifts as banks adjust to the possibility of a hard Brexit. In the 
fluid world of high finance, moreover, those shifts could easily be reversed as the legal 
environment settles down. 
Any kind of Brexit will presumably reduce trade between the U.K. and the EU, and with 
about $355 billion in annual exports at stake, the British government is right to be cautious. 
But the country also imports about $445 billion annually from the EU. If a reduction in trade 
is even across the board (say, a 10 percent reduction in both exports and imports), the British 
economy will actually come out ahead in terms of GDP growth due to a reduced trade deficit. 
With everyone forecasting a weaker British pound post-Brexit, it may even be that British 
exports come out well ahead. Boosted by a weaker pound, the British trade deficit narrowed 
by more than $18 billion in 2017. Less trade can be a good thing, if you’re a net importer like 
the U.K. This idea is highly contentious, but in any case, a falling pound could even partially 
offset any increasing tariffs facing British goods bound for the EU. 
* * * 
Economic experts do have a role to play in informing people about the likely impacts of 
major policy decisions like Brexit. They also have a responsibility to come clean about the 
uncertainties underlying their forecasts. 
If Brexit were actually certain to destroy the British economy or lead toeconomic and 
political disaster, experts would be justified in issuing such dire warnings. But for most 
people with tickets to fly from London to Paris on March 30, a breakdown in the baggage 
handling system is a bigger worry than the possibility that all air travel between the U.K. and 
the EU will be suspended on that day. Similarly, though tariffs might be annoying for 
businesses, they are not cataclysmic. After all, even a trade war between the United States 
and China has not stopped U.S.-Chinese trade. 
In well-functioning democracies, unpopular outcomes rarely mean the end of the world. 
Experts should make their cases, and robustly so. But they should also admit the limits of 
their expertise. As history had it, Caractacus got a last-minute pardon from the Roman Senate 
and never was paraded through the streets of Rome. Maybe the United Kingdom will make 
out even better with the European Commission. Or maybe not. Either way, there will be 
consequences. What those consequences will be, though, is hard to say. 
 
 
